Only the Dead Have Seen the Last of Submarine Warfare – Part One

Iain Ballantyne, author of ‘The Deadly Trade: The Complete History of Submarine Warfare from Archimedes to the Present’, begins a two-part look at the contours of a fast evolving new struggle in which the UK’s submarines and surface forces will inevitably be required to play a key role.

Whether it has been the French, US-based Fenians pursuing the cause of Irish Liberation, the German Navy – by order of the Kaiser and later the Fuhrer – or the Soviet Union, the enemies and potential foes of Britain and its allies have over many decades enthusiastically pursued submarine warfare.

While we are unlikely to see vast, epic clashes as occurred during the two world wars, it is likely only the dead have seen the last of submarine warfare (to adapt a famous phrase coined by the philosopher George Santayana – NOT Plato as some have claimed – who wrote in 1922: ‘Only the dead have seen the end of war’).

In fact, submarines of the West and Russia have in recent times frequently unleashed weapons in anger – to strike deep inland, via cruise missiles, rather than using torpedoes to sink ships – while a new Cold War-style confrontation is also evolving across the oceans, stretching all the way from the North Atlantic and Mediterranean to the South China Sea.

Symbol of a resurgent Russia under the sea: The Improved Kilo Class submarine Rostov-on-Don, which Moscow has used to fire Kalibr cruise missiles into Syria. Photo: © Cem Devrim Yaylali. https://turkishnavy.net

Today Russia is deploying more and more submarines to test the defences of NATO nations and a high priority in the North Atlantic remains detecting and trailing the nuclear deterrent boats of the UK, USA and France. Meanwhile, on the other side of the world, the assault ship HMS Albion in the late summer of 2018 made her presence felt in the South China Sea, where she conducted a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) in waters that Beijing has (illegally) claimed sovereignty over. China has flouted international law by constructing a chain of fortresses on reefs and small islands, in a bid for total dominance of surrounding waters (and in which it intends to create Soviet-style bastions to protect its nuclear missile submarines). The Royal Navy has joined the American, Japanese and Australian fleets in agreeing on a major effort to show China it cannot restrict rights of transit through such key zones.

Arguably the best counter to Russia’s submarines lurking on the edge of UK territorial waters – or the Chinese seeking to exert unwarranted control on (or under) the South China Sea – is another submarine, namely a nuclear-powered hunter-killer. In that respect the British have something to offer. Despite difficulty maintaining force levels since the end of the Cold War they have preserved a reputation as deadly exponents of submarine operations.

Given the hostile attitude of many Royal Navy admirals in the early 1900s to the mere idea of submarines, development of such expertise over the years was not necessarily a given. Yet the RN’s submarine arm has achieved many feats in combat, some of which have yet to be equalled (which, let’s face it, is actually a good thing as it means an absence of major sea wars).

The one confirmed instance of a submarine destroying another while both were submerged remains HMS Venturer’s sinking of U-864 off Norway in early 1945. The only time a nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine has sunk a surface vessel in time of war remains HMS Conqueror’s attack on ARA Belgrano during the 1982 Falklands conflict. Since WW2 the only other episodes in which submarines have sunk surface vessels using torpedoes are the sinking an Indian frigate by the Pakistan Navy boat Hangor (in the early 1970s) and destruction of a South Korean corvette by a North Korean craft in 2010.

The assault ship HMS Albion calls at Yokosuka, Japan, prior to her recent patrol in the South China Sea. Photo: US Navy.

During the latter stages of Cold War – which saw plenty of dangerous moments that, thankfully, did not result in actual, full-on submarine versus submarine combat – the novelist Tom Clancy upset his own nation’s navy by paying tribute to Britain’s formidable submariners rather too enthusiastically.

‘While everyone deeply respects the Americans with their technologically and numerically superior submarine force, they all quietly fear the British,’ Clancy observed. He added: ‘Note that I use the word fear. Not just respect. Not just awe. But real fear at what a British submarine, with one of their superbly qualified captains at the helm, might be capable of doing.’ Those skills were very much in demand during the confrontation between NATO and the Soviet Union, with British submarines on the leading edge of a high stakes poker game under the waves, which saw numerous close shaves.

Watching the Hollywood version of Clancy’s best selling-novel, ‘The Hunt for Red October’, the other day, it struck me that it no longer seems like a 1980s museum piece. Today we are back in ‘a war with no battles, no monuments’, as Captain Marko Ramius (played by Sean Connery) puts it in the movie. The revival in Hollywood interest in submarine movies, such as ‘Hunter Killer’  [not based on my own book] and the forthcoming ‘Kursk’  reflects the upsurge in tensions and rivalry and under the sea between East and West (as well as the enduring appeal of submarine dramas).

For the West is confronted with what Vice Admiral James Foggo USN in 2016 described as a fourth Battle of the Atlantic – following on from those of the 20th Century’s two world wars and the Cold War – in which a new generation of Russian submariners are seeking to dominate the oceans. In October 2015 another senior USN officer, Admiral Mark Ferguson, who at the time commanded NATO’s Allied Joint Force Command and US Navy forces in Europe and Africa, depicted Moscow as constructing ‘an arc of steel from the Arctic to the Mediterranean’ by deploying ‘a more aggressive, more capable Russian Navy’.

Holding the line in the new Battle of the Atlantic: The Royal Navy nuclear-powered attack submarine HMS Trenchant. Photo: US Navy.

The Russians mean to exert this decisive presence as part of a global maritime challenge to the West. At the beginning of 2015 Russian submarines reportedly tried to detect – and then trail – one of the UK’s Trident submarines as the latter departed (or returned to) its base on the Clyde. Having cut the RN’s frigate force and axed the Nimrod anti-submarine aircraft, under the calamitous 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), the UK Government had to ask its allies to help hunt down the intruder or intruders (a job previously performed by the Royal Navy in tandem with the RAF).

In fact, since 2014 – following the Crimean annexation that heralded a more aggressive Russian military – Moscow is suspected of regularly sending its submarines to stray close to, or even sneak into, territorial waters of not only the UK and USA, but also Sweden, Finland, Norway and the Baltic States.

Fears were raised at the end of 2017 that the Russians might even use their submarine forces to attack the UK’s seabed infrastructure, such as Internet cables and energy pipelines. This was surely not unexpected? Since WW2 the capability to interfere with (or sever) underwater cables has been pursued by leading submarines forces (of both East and West). For example, during WW2 the Royal Navy made a major effort to cut seabed communications links between Japanese garrisons scattered across Asia. The latter day effort by the Russians serves only to enhance the contention that we have not seen the end of submarine warfare – in all its many forms.

This is an adapted version of an article that was published in The Association of Royal Navy Officers Newsletter (Summer 2018)

 

xx

Recent episodes in the new East-West naval rivalry and action-packed aspects of submarine warfare across the ages are recounted in Iain Ballantyne’s new book ‘The Deadly Trade: The Complete History of Submarine Warfare from Archimedes to the Present’, published by Weidenfeld & Nicolson (752 pages, hardback £25.00/eBook £12.99). More details:  It is available via Amazon and Waterstones or other retailers and shops.
Iain Ballantyne is also founding and current Editor of WARSHIPS International Fleet Review magazine, www.warshipsifr.com which in 2018 celebrated its 20th birthday.

Convoy Battles were as Important as El Alamein, Stalingrad or Guadalcanal

Seventy-five years ago saw what has often been lauded as the moment of victory for the Allies in the Battle of the Atlantic. The key clashes were staged across April and May 1943, with convoy escorts battling a U-boat force encouraged by an impressive score in March – sinking 107 Allied ships in the month’s first 20 days – to believe it could yet secure supreme triumph for Germany.

As was so often the case in war, such an upswing in fortune could so easily become a downturn and signs of the German decline to come were there even in March. The month had closed amid dreadful weather, with only 15 enemy merchant vessels sent to the bottom by U-boats during its final 11 days. The submarine crews were tired, the boats battered and in need of repair, while fuel and torpedo stocks were depleted.

A U-boat hunts for a convoy in the vast N. Atlantic. Image: Dennis Andrews.

Yet the resilient U-boat force soon sent its submarines back into action, to become locked in battle with escort groups, trying to break through and attack merchant vessels.

The first of the pivotal fights came in early April with the assault on convoy HX-231, of 61 merchant vessels, a battle stretching across hundreds of miles of ocean. The cutting edge of the wolf pack was blunted above all by the determined actions of the B7 escort group, led by the Royal Navy’s formidable Commander Peter Gretton. Six merchant vessels were sunk, for no boats lost, but the overall performance of the German submarines had been timid, the U-boat force War Log blaming it on ‘the inexperience of young Commanding Officers.’

A British escort charges off to tackle a U-boat to prevent it from sinking merchant ships in convoy across the Atlantic. Image: Dennis Andrews.

In fact, morale was so fragile in the U-boat force that some submarine COs eagerly embraced any mechanical defect to report their vessels non-operational. Kriegsmarine commander-in-chief Grand Admiral Karl Donitz responded by threatening stiffer penalties for those he perceived to be shirkers.

The B7 group was also sent out to protect the 41-ship convoy ONS-5. The U-boats were ordered by their boss to wait for nightfall on 5 May and then to attack with vigour in order to ensure ‘there will be nothing of the convoy left’. This was far from being the case, with just 13 merchant vessels sunk, a poor return for five U-boats and their crews destroyed.

When the U-boats tried to score big again in late May, they failed utterly, with four submarines lost during attempts to attack convoy SC-130. All 37 of its precious merchant vessels – carrying fuel oil, explosives, lumber and grain among other things – were delivered safely to Liverpool.

By this time in the contest Allied escort groups & aircraft were clearly achieving a measure of superiority in the open ocean war that stacked the odds heavily against Germany’s submariners. In the first five months of 1943, Allied warships and aircraft sank 81 U-boats. With that rate of losses Donitz felt he had no choice but to admit wolf pack operations were no longer possible – at least not for the time being. He therefore issued an order for U-boats to withdraw from the North Atlantic on May 24.

The quality of Allied warships, not least their weapons and U-boat detecting equipment, had risen dramatically since German submarines had been able to wreak havoc on convoys (especially during 1940 – 1941). The senior leadership of the Allied escorts – the skill of junior officers too – was also greatly improved.

Gretton, along with other escort group commanders, including the equally lethally proficient Donald Macintyre and ‘Johnny’ Walker, were now getting into their stride. As they wielded their ships to great effect, long-range air patrols by Allied air forces bore down heavily on the enemy too, at times scoring a similarly devastating rate of kills.

An Allied aircraft attacks a U-boat as the struggle in the N. Atlantic continues during WW2. Photo: US Navy/NHHC.

Amid all the memorializing of the great victories on land at the end of 1942 and in the first half of 1943, the great turning of the tide against the Axis – via the British victory at the Second Battle of El Alamein, the Sixth Army surrendering to the Russians at Stalingrad, the capture of 275,000 Italian and German troops in Tunisia and Americans triumphing at Guadalcanal – the significance of the convoy battles in the Atlantic of April and May 1943 can become forgotten. Such critical events in the turn of the tide at sea risk being lost amid the amorphous term Battle of the Atlantic.

Those laurels that were awarded to the warship captains who beat the U-boats came in the form of paper slips on which were written decryptions of coded signals conveying congratulations from senior commanders. In the aftermath of the fight to get ONS-5 through there was at least a message of thanks from Prime Minister Winston Churchill signaled to escorts.

One post-war admiral – a junior officer serving in destroyers during 1943 – judged Allied victories in the Battle of the Atlantic to be as great as any land victory. According to Vice Admiral Sir Roderick Macdonald, they were vital in ‘preparing the way for the invasion of Europe’. Had it been fought ashore, or even a sea engagement in the age of fighting sail, the ONS-5 victory ‘would be [lauded] in the history books, like Salamis or Trafalgar’ for it was ‘no skirmish’ and the battle ‘to defend convoy ONS-5 was of more significance than Alamein.’

That may be stretching it a little, but the point is well made, for pitched battles at sea do not leave behind scarred buildings or pockmarked bunkers, or wrecked tanks littering the landscape. Nor do the casualties lie in lovingly tended war cemeteries close to the scene of the battle to offer an all too tangible reminder of sacrifice.

Those who perished in the battles for convoys HX-231, ONS-5 and SC-130 lie in unseen and unknowable watery graves, vanished under the sea either inside their sunken ships and submarines or swept away by the cruel sea until absorbed into the vastness of the ocean.


Each merchant vessel that reached a UK port was another victory for the Allies in the struggle against the U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic during WW2. Photo: US National Archives.

Victory for the Allies was actually recorded in the ships the enemy never saw – the vessels that slid by the U-boats without a shot being fired and to enter a British port to offload their vital cargoes, all routine and largely unremarked. Each ship unloaded was, however, another small victory and diminished even further Germany’s chances of success.

Even though May 1943 is often regarded as the moment when the Battle of the Atlantic was won by the Allies – enabling the invasion of Normandy just over a year later – in reality the bitter struggle between Allied escorts/airpower and U-boats continued right until the end of the war in Europe. There were even fears the war at sea off Europe could still be lost by the Allies.

It morphed into a different kind of contest – in fact a series of contests stretching from the deep ocean to inshore waters around N.W. Europe – that at various times was arguably harder for the Allies to deal with, though the US Navy’s escort carrier hunter-killer groups reaped a devastating harvest in the mid-Atlantic, around the Azores. Tough as the fight may have become once again, British escort groups were relentless elsewhere.

The Allies feared the ‘U-boat peril’ (to borrow Churchill’s description) right up until the Reich’s total collapse, not just because of the looming (if troubled) introduction into service of the much-vaunted Type XXI and Type XXIII U-boats, but the Total Underwater Warfare concept.

Donitz hoped it could deliver final victory to Germany. So, in May 1943 the war of the transatlantic convoys may have peaked but now the battles had different objectives and the Allies’ hard won advantages were under threat of neutralization by Total Underwater Warfare.

 

How that German bid to achieve victory at sea unfolded – along with many other episodes in submarine warfare across the ages – is told in my latest book ‘The Deadly Trade: The Complete History of Submarine Warfare from Archimedes to the Present’, published by Weidenfeld & Nicolson (752 pages, hardback £25.00/eBook £12.99) which is available via Amazon and Waterstones plus other retailers and shops.

Kremlin sends out ASW ‘search-and-strike’ group

• Strike carrier reinforces Med US Navy presence
• Is Russian ‘carrier-killer’ submarine being deployed?
• Only the latest naval face-off in Med

Heavy-hitting reinforcements for US Navy forces in the Mediterranean have now arrived, with the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group (HSTCSG) and its powerful array of warships completing the trans-Atlantic crossing in just over a week.

They join US Navy’s Sixth Fleet area of operations (AOR) at a time of continuing high tension between Russia and the West. The entry of the Harry S. Truman comes less than a week after bombardment of suspected chemical weapons sites in Syria by US Navy surface warships and a submarine, along with a French frigate – all firing cruise missiles – in tandem with air strikes by jet fighters from the USA, France and the UK. The cruise missiles fired by the US Navy attack boat USS John Warner were the first ever fired in anger by a submarine of the Virginia Class, the American navy’s latest SSN type.

The US Navy attack submarine USS John Warner in the Mediterranean. She has since launched cruise missiles against targets in Syria. Photo: NATO.

Within days of the Syria strikes, the Kremlin deployed an Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) ‘search-and-strike group’, as the Russian Navy termed it, from the Northern Fleet in the Arctic. The destroyers Severomorsk and Vice Admiral Kulakov (both Udaloy I Class ships) were, according to the Russians, in the Barents Sea conducting a ‘test tactical drill on searching for and destroying’ what was further described as a ‘simulated enemy submarine’.

One of the Russian destroyers engaged in the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) exercise in the Barents Sea. Photo: Russian defence ministry.

However, it was not beyond the bounds of possibility that the Russian exercise was in reality a means to sanitise exit routes for Russian submarines being deployed to go and shadow the Harry S. Truman and her battle group. A potential candidate for that mission is the Oscar II Class ‘carrier killer’ submarine Oryol, which last year emerged from a major refit. The 24,000 tons (dived) submarine is now armed with 3M-54 Kalibr land-attack and anti-shipping cruise missiles.

The Northern Fleet nuclear-powered Oscar II Class ‘carrier killer’ submarine Oryol returning to her base in the Kola Peninsula after her major upgrade. Photo: Russian defence ministry.

If Oryol has been sent out, Russian attack submarines would also have been deployed to ‘delouse’ waters off the main naval bases in the Kola Peninsula, in case there were any NATO submarines snooping around – although one of them could not be the British hunter-killer boat HMS Trenchant. Following her dramatic exploits alongside American submarines in the Arctic, surfacing through polar ice, the Trafalgar Class SSN this week sailed into Submarine Base New London, on the east coast of the USA, for a port visit.


HMS Trenchant approaches the pier at Naval Submarine Base New London for a port visit after participating in ICEX 2018. Photo: US Navy.

Scheduled to last several days, the Russian ASW exercise in the Barents was due to involve ‘tasks of engaging the simulated submarine enemy,’ according to the Russian defence ministry. It also advised that its ASW warships would ‘conduct torpedo firing with practical ammunition.’ During the old Cold War between Russia and the West this might have been considered convenient cover for the pursuit of a NATO submarine on surveillance mission in the Barents.

From the late 1940s to the early 1990s there was an almost continual forward deployment of US Navy and Royal Navy submarines into the Barents – considered by the Russians to be Mare Nostrum – to gather intelligence on weapons tests and the latest surface ships and submarines operated by the foe. Armed with sound signature and radar emissions intelligence, and details of weaponry, NATO hoped to stand a better chance of fighting off any massive Soviet surge into the North Atlantic if the Cold War turned hot.

As the Russian ASW ‘exercise’ got underway in the Arctic this month, a highly significant face-to-face meeting was being held in Baku, Azerbaijan, between NATO’s current Supreme Allied Commander Europe, US Army General Curtis Scaparrotti and the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov.

The neutral ground summit was called to discuss relations between NATO and Russia, but was surely also a means to ensure Moscow’s military and those of Western nations do not clash in any future episodes in which weaponry is unleashed to against Syrian targets. A Russian defence ministry account explained: ‘They also exchanged views on the situation in Syria, stressing the necessity of cooperation in fighting against international terrorism.’ For the Russians the latter group does not include President Assad’s regime in Syria, however.

The USS Harry S. Truman is no stranger to operations in the US 6th Fleet AOR, having been sent there to conduct strikes on ISIL targets in Syria in the summer of 2016. The US Navy has in the past frequently also stationed a strike carrier in the neighbouring 5th Fleet AOR – covering waters off Arabia – but at the time of last weekend’s strikes on Syria, the assigned ship, USS Theodore Roosevelt, was in the South China Sea, another zone of increased tension at sea.

The US Navy strike carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in the eastern Mediterranean while working with the French carrier FS Charles de Gaulle. Photo: US Navy.

Russian submarine deployments to shadow American Carrier Strike Groups in the eastern Med are nothing new either. In late 2016 NATO warships detected and then tracked at least one Russian nuclear-powered submarine sent from the Northern Fleet to shadow the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower. This came as the Nimitz Class carrier was conducting joint strike operations against Islamic State targets in Syria with the French Navy strike carrier FS Charles de Gaulle.

Around the same time NATO also sent its submarines to shadow Russia’s carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov. As related in ‘The Deadly Trade’ the Russian defence ministry claimed it had been forced to order Vice Admiral Kulakov and Severomorsk – the same ships involved in today’s ASW exercise in the Barents – to chase away a Dutch diesel-electric submarine attempting to trail the Kuznetsov (as the carrier prepared to launch her own jets on missions against Syrian targets).

 

 

More on the undersea and surface navy face-off between Russia and the West in recent years and during the Cold War is to be found in ‘The Deadly Trade: The Complete History of Submarine Warfare from Archimedes to the Present’, published by Weidenfeld & Nicolson (752 pages, hardback £25.00/eBook £12.99)  which is available via Amazon or Waterstones and other retailers and shops.
The latest edition of WARSHIPS IFR magazine (May 2018), whose Editor is Iain Ballantyne, is out now. It includes a look at the formidable new weapons being created by order of President Putin to try and cow the West, along with reports and pictures from a recent major Anti-submarine Warfare exercise staged by NATO in the Mediterranean.

Archive by month

Archive by year